We conduct a basic analysis of entry and exit in the US broadband market, using a complete FCC census of providers from 2005 to 2008. There is a tremendous amount of (simultaneous) entry and exit in the US broadband market. Most entry is from existing providers expanding into new geographic areas. Entry and exit vary widely across the various modes of provision, which argues against treating broadband as a homogenous service in theoretical or empirical work. The highest entry rates also generally have the highest entrant shares. Entry rates display positive autocorrelation, and the same is true for exit. There is also positive correlation between the entry and exit rates at various leads and lags, suggesting that there are systematic differences among the broadband types in the height of entry and exit barriers. We discuss some implications these results may have for both policy purposes and future work in the broadband market.
Introduction
The importance of broadband Internet access to modern life as consumers, citizens, students, producers of goods and services, and providers of public safety is well established. The broadband market is also of particular interest to economists given the importance of broadband for local economic development, labor productivity, and GDP growth (Gillett et al., 2006; Greenstein and McDevitt, 2009; Kolko, 2010; Prieger, 2013) . Some recent critics charge that the US lags other developed countries in the affordability and capability of broadband, and characterize the industry as lacking sufficient competition and being slow to offer new and better services (e.g., Fransman, 2006; Crawford, 2013) . Despite such claims and the importance of the broadband market, however, little work has been done on the dynamics of the market. In this article, we show that there is actually a great amount of entry and exit -the hallmarks of competition -in the US broadband market.
We examine the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) data on where broadband service was offered from June 2005 to June 2008. By linking broadband service providers' data submissions over time, we are able to measure and investigate the sources and determinants of entry and exit in the US broadband market. We define markets four ways for purposes of study: the geographical extent of the market is either the nation or a ZIP code area, and the product market extent is either a single broadband type or all types.
Instead of jumping directly to regressions or structural modeling of the industry, we instead conduct a more basic empirical investigation of entry and exit in this paper. In the terms of Geroski (1995) , our aim is to set out stylized facts coming from basic descriptions of the data, instead of stylized (or specific) results from regressions. In taking this approach, we apply the lessons from recent decades in the IO literature that establishing basic descriptive facts about industry entry and exit can motivate better theoretical and empirical modeling. As an example, Einav and Levin (2010) cite the findings of Dunne et al. (1988) and others that there is a great deal of heterogeneity between firms' entry and exit patterns. Dunne et al. (1988) 's findings motivated a wave of new theoretical and empirical models of industry dynamics including firm heterogeneity, simultaneous entry and exit, and other "real world" features (e.g., Jovanovic, 1982; Hopenhayn, 1992; Ericson and Pakes, 1995) . These models were better able to account for the stylized facts the literature had accumulated, including that a great deal of exit can coexist with entry, and that entry and exit rates are highly correlated across industries (Geroski, 1995) , so that industry-specific factors appear to be important in explaining market dynamics.
Toward the goal of building a set of basic facts about market dynamics in broadband markets, we address several questions in this paper. How do the market dynamics compare with what is known about other markets? How much entry in the local markets comes from truly new entrants, and how much is from expansion of existing firms? Are there substantial differences in entry and exit across geographic and product-type markets? And finally, how much turnover of firms is there? We close this section with a preview of our findings regarding these questions.
First, how do entry and exit in the broadband market compare with that in other markets? The striking conclusion is that there is a tremendous amount of dynamic activity in the US broadband market. In the national market, the entry rate averages 14-19% annually, which is greater than the entry rates the economic literature has found for many other industries. The exit rate for broadband is also higher than for other industries, but not as high as the entry rate, so that net entry averages 3.1% annually. With narrower geographic or service type market definitions, the entry rates average from 24% to an astounding 49% per annum. Thus, the dynamic element in the market is huge.
The second question, whence comes entry, has policy relevance to questions regarding competition and mergers in the telecommunications and broadband industry. While the FCC pays great attention to potential dominance by large providers at the national level (e.g., their denial of the recently proposed AT&T/TMobile merger), what matters for consumers is the number of options available where they live. 1 We demonstrate that at least three in four entrants at the ZIP code level expand geographically into the area. When the local markets are delineated by service type, another one in every five entrants is a firm already operating in the area that diversifies its product mix by offering another type of broadband access. These entrants are also much larger than de novo entrants on average. Thus, most entry and much of the dynamism in the market, along with the new options that entry provides for consumers, comes from large, existing firms.
The third question of heterogeneity in dynamics among areas and broadband service types also has policy relevance. Since the main form of competition in broadband markets at the time was between the incumbent DSL provider and the local franchise cable company offering cable modem service, it is important to understand how the dynamics among those types of firms may differ. We show that average entry and exit rates mask much variation among different types of broadband service; entry is much more prominent in some broadband types than others. In particular, in the local markets there is five times as much entry in the DSL than in the cable modem markets. There is also great variation in exit rates. Thus, analyses that lump together all broadband types in a market, as most of the previous work cited above had to do, may miss much interesting variation and strategic interaction via intermodal competition.
The final question of turnover of firms in the marketplace impinges directly on previous work done in this area. Only one paper of which we are aware has attempted directly to address dynamics in the broadband marketplace. Xiao and Orazem (2011) extend Reiss's (1991, 1994) model of local oligopoly to allow firms to enter and exit the ZIP code-level markets. Their work makes creative use of the publicly available data from the FCC, which (at the time) consisted only of counts of firms offering service in the ZIP code, undifferentiated by type. The data do not reveal the identities of market participants, and so true longitudinal data on the firms in the local markets is unavailable. They find that once the market has one to three firms, the fourth and succeeding entrants have little effect on competitive conduct, which they infer from their findings regarding the role of sunk costs in determining entry conditions. A key assumption, which the authors are forced to hold out of necessity given their data, is that there is no simultaneous entry and exit. In other words, when net entry is zero in a market/period, it is assumed that there is no churn. Our investigation here shows this assumption is untenable. In fact, using the same FCC data (but for our later time period, [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] , we find that in ZIP codes with no net entry in a period, a full 41.2% of the time there was simultaneous entry and exit (i.e., within the prior 6 months).
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The work here differs from most previous studies of entry in the market for broadband service provision, which are static in nature. In a typical such study, a cross-section of either the number of broadband firms or an indicator for the presence of at least one firm in the local area is regressed on various market and demographic characteristics (Prieger, 2003; Grubesic and Murray, 2004; Flamm, 2005, Prieger and Church, 2012) . These studies of broadband availability in the US show that firms' decisions to deploy network resources and offer service in a local area depend on economic and regulatory considerations. Demand factors such as the size of the local market, average income in the area, and other demographic characteristics such as the education and age profile of the area have all been shown to affect broadband penetration (Prieger, 2003; Grubesic and Murray, 2004; Flamm, 2005; Flamm and Chaudhuri, 2007; Prieger and Hu, 2008b) .
3 Some of these studies also show that variables that are proxies for cost factors, such as population density, terrain, etc., also influence broadband penetration in the expected ways. Due to low population density and generally rougher topography than urban areas, rural areas are less likely to have broadband available at all, or more likely to be served only with lower-speed broadband or by few providers (Stenberg et al., 2009; Li et al., 2011; Prieger, 2013) . Intramodal and intermodal competition among providers, both actual and potential, also affects the incentives to enter the local broadband markets (Denni and Gruber, 2007; Prieger and Hu, 2008a; Wallsten and Mallahan, 2010) . Regulatory policy that alters the expected return on broadband network investment, such as mandated unbundling of network elements for use by competitors, can also impact the deployment decision by Prieger and Lee (2008) . Almost all these results have been gleaned from cross-sectional, static studies of current market participants.
In the next section, we describe the FCC data and our measures of entry and exit. In Section 3, we present results for entry and exit rates, in the form of averages, variation across types of broadband, autocorrelation, and correlation with each other. A concluding section gathers the results into a set of stylized facts for the industry.
Measuring the Entry and Exit Broadband Providers

Data Construction
Broadband Provider Data
The FCC has collected data from providers of end-user broadband service since 1999. Facilities-based providers of broadband connections to end-user locations complete the semi-annual Form 477, which until 2009 required them to list each five-digit ZIP code in which they provide service. Per FCC rules, a "facilities-based provider" is an entity that: owns the "last mile" of network to the end-user location used for a broadband connection; provisions broadband wireless channels to end-user locations; or obtains unbundled network elements or other leased lines to end-user locations and provisions them to supply broadband service (FCC 2006) . 4, 5 The firms provide separate ZIP code lists for each type of broadband service offered. During the period June 2005-June 2008, the years we study here, 6 the broadband types were categorized as asymmetric DSL (ADSL), broadband over power line (BPL), cable modem, fiber, satellite, fixed terrestrial wireless (also 4 The FCC designed its reporting rules to avoid double-counting of broadband lines. Providers report only if they are the end-user provider and only if they offer "facilities based service." The latter clause means that if company A owns the infrastructure but rents it to company B to provide DSL, and company B uses no infrastructure of its own, then A files Form 477 and B does not. If, however, company C owns the local loop to the premises but company D has installed a DSLAM in C's central office (the network equipment necessary to enable DSL service) and has obtained unbundled access to the local loop, then D files in Form 477 and C does not. 5 The reporting firm does not necessarily have a retail relationship with the end user of the broadband connection, in the case of pure resale or a facilities-based provider selling broadband connection or service to an unaffiliated ISP incorporating it into its own high-speed Internetaccess service marketed to end users. 6 The FCC provided the Form 477 data to the authors under a confidentiality agreement covering data through 2008. Even if later data were available, there would be difficulty in merging the periods, since in 2009 the providers began reporting local service at the Census tract level instead of the ZIP code. The analysis begin in 2005 because earlier reporting requirements exempted small broadband providers (see notes to Table 1). known as wireless Internet service providers, WISPs), mobile terrestrial wireless, symmetric DSL (SDSL), and "other."
7 The lists do not include information on the number of subscribers served within the ZIP code area.
To set the years we study in the context of the last decade and a half of the US broadband market, Table 1 presents growth rates of broadband subscriber lines from 1999 to 2012. These years include all available rounds of publicly available data from the FCC on broadband access. 8 The growth rates for all types of broadband were very high during 1999-2002, a period beginning with little broadband subscription in the US. Growth in broadband subscribership during 2005-2008 averaged 38% per annum, about the same as during [2002] [2003] [2004] and greater than in later years when the market was more mature. Overall growth is slowest in 2008-2012, as to be expected with higher penetration levels and an ogive diffusion curve. The recession during late 2007-2009 and the weaker economy that followed undoubtedly also moderated growth during that period. Looking at the growth rates for the individual broadband types shows how the industry was changing during our period of study. In 2005-2008, ADSL was still a growing service, but its growth was slowing as subscribers switched to fiber with services such as Verizon FIOS and AT&T U-Verse. Symmetric DSL, a service chiefly used by businesses, began to see its market share erode as these users also switched to fiber. Cable modem service grew at a slower pace than previously as the market matured. The most striking statistic during 2005-2008 is the growth rate of mobile wireless service: an incredible 169% per annum. The strong growth in mobile wireless service during the period is due in part to the fact that although subscribers usually have only one form of fixed broadband service, subscription to mobile service is typically in addition to fixed service. To sum up, entry and exit during 2005-2008 take place against a backdrop of market demand shifting partially away from DSL and cable modem service toward fiber, with mobile broadband exploding onto the scene during this time as well.
Given our interest in marketplace dynamics -the entry and exit of broadband providers -we linked firms' Form 477 filings over time.
9 Linking firms' filings required accounting for variation in company names, mergers, acquisitions, spin-offs, cable system area swaps and other asset sales and transfers, and other phenomena affecting matching.
10 In our treatment of corporate dynamics, our aim was to adhere to existing practice in the academic literature on empirical studies of firm dynamics, 10 Within each round, we examined the lists of firms that disappeared from many ZIP codes to determine if a merger, name change, or major sales of assets explained the apparent exit. Similarly, we examined the lists of firms that newly appeared in many ZIP codes to determine if a name change or major purchase of assets explained the apparent entry. We collected information on as many mergers, etc., as we could find from newspapers, the trade press, SEC filings, and Internet sources. Nevertheless, it is important to note that we likely missed some corporate reorganizations and (particularly) asset sales among smaller firms. most particularly Dunne et al. (1988) . 11 First, straightforward asset sales and swaps are not treated as exit of the old owner followed by entry of the new owner, whenever we had information on the transactions.
12 Given the difficulty in finding specific information on asset transfers, we undoubtedly missed some among smaller firms, perhaps leading to overstated measures of turnover within some markets.
For mergers and acquisitions, when the two merging firms already compete in the same market, we treat the combination of the firms in the market as resulting in one continuing firm and one exit. 13 When the acquired firm offered service in a market in one period and the new entity appears in the market in the next period after the merger, we treat it as a continuing firm.
For reverse mergers and corporate spin-offs, when the involved parties go from one firm to two firms within a market, we treat only one of the firms as entering the market. For example, consider the case when ALLTEL spun off its wired broadband service business as Windstream in 2006. If ALLTEL was in a market before the spinoff, and both ALLTEL and Windstream are in the same market after, then Windstream alone is counted as an entrant. On the other hand, if ALLTEL is in a market before the spinoff but only Windstream is in the same market afterward, then Windstream is treated as a continuing firm. 
ZIP Code Data
The second issue involved with creating a dynamic picture of the market is that the universe of ZIP codes changes over time. The US Postal Service constantly 11 Dunne et al. (1988) , the seminal empirical study of firm entry and exit in the modern industrial organization literature, study entry and exit in the manufacturing sector of the US economy during the years [1963] [1964] [1965] [1966] [1967] [1968] [1969] [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] . 12 For example, as part of the Adelphia acquisition that was effective in August 2006, Comcast and Time Warner swapped system ownership in various areas. Any apparent exit of Comcast in a market followed by subsequent apparent entry of Time Warner (or vice versa) was thus not treated as actual exit or entry. 13 The decision of which firm we treat as the exiting company matters in some of the measures of exit we consider below (namely, the measures of exiters' market share and relative size). In the case of acquisitions, we treat the acquired firm as the exiter. For mergers, we judged which firm appeared to be the dominant partner in the merger (e.g., we treated SBC as the continuing firm and AT&T as the exiting firm in the SBC-AT&T merger, despite the fact that the new firm kept the AT&T moniker). In one case, three firms merged (Choice One Communications, CTC Communications, and Conversent Communications merged to form One Communications Corp. in July 2006), and so in markets where all three competed, two were marked as exiting. 14 For the few unwindings of 50-50 partnerships we found (e.g., the Comcast-Insight Communications Company partnership unwinding in 2007), we treat any name change in a market (e.g., creates new codes and removes obsolete codes from use. We use ZIP Code Tabulation Areas (ZCTAs) defined for the 2000 Census for our geographical market boundaries. ZCTAs generally correspond closely to the delivery area of a ZIP code.
15 ZCTAs have two advantages over ZIP codes for market definition. ZCTA definitions are stable, whereas the US Postal Service changes ZIP code definitions over time. Also, ZCTAs are actual geographic areas, whereas ZIP codes merely define collections of postal delivery addresses. We mapped the reported ZIP codes in the FCC data each year to the stable boundaries of the ZCTA's.
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Despite our actual use of ZCTA's, we will continue to refer to "ZIP code areas" below.
Entry and Exit Measures
We analyze several measures of entry and exit in the market for broadband provision. To allow comparison and to follow best practice in the academic literature on market dynamics, we define our measures as in Dunne et al. (1988) . We analyze gross entry and exit (i.e., counts of entering and exiting firms separately) rather than net entry (i.e., the net change in the number of firms in a market, where net exit is counted as negative net entry). The economic literature on market dynamics [such as Dunne et al. (1988) ] points out that gross measures are appropriate to examine industry dynamics, since gross entry and exit may be high even when net entry is low. 17 an Insight system in Illinois changing to a Comcast system after the unwinding) as exit followed by entry, under the assumption that the holding company that filed the area in its Form 477 probably had the upper hand in its management under the partnership. 15 Most exceptions are for areas like national parks that are not important for this work. The Census Bureau defines each ZCTA to represent a five-digit ZIP code where possible. Refer to Section 2.3 of Grubesic (2008) for in-depth discussion of how ZCTAs relate to ZIP codes and other Census geography. 16 We mapped ZIP's to ZCTA's with the crosswalk files provided by The U.S. Department of Health & Human Resources (see Goodman (2005) for methodology). By far the most common substantive change in USPS ZIP code areas is splitting a ZIP code into two areas, one of which will be designated with a new number. In such cases both new areas are mapped back into the original ZCTA and combined in our methodology. 17 In the publicly available Form 477 data, company identities are not revealed, and only net entry can be studied [as in Xiao and Orazem (2011) ]. Even then, not all net entry is observable, given that the FCC censors the publicly available data when one to three providers are in the ZIP code.
Market Definition
To begin with, the market must be defined, since entry and exit must be quantified with reference to a precisely defined market. From the household's perspective, the market consists of all broadband providers able to serve the household's location. Thus, the geographic extent of the market in this perspective is no larger than the walls of the house. The same is true for business subscribers. Using the logic of the familiar SSNIP test from antitrust law and economics, 18 for example, one can see that the prices offered to households adjacent to our original "market of one" household are irrelevant in the original household's demand decision. Thus, starting with a market of one household, the SSNIP test never increases the size of the market. That is, the household can never "go next door" to buy broadband service at a better price. 19 In the product space, however, different modes of broadband provision are substitutable to some degree. Thus, as argued by Cardona et al. (2009) , it may make sense to put cable modem service in same market as DSL, even though they are not perfectly substitutable. It may make less sense to put mobile wireless broadband in the same market as DSL, given that DSL service does not "travel" with the user. 20 Nonetheless, in some parts of the world DSL and mobile broadband have been found to be close substitutes ( Vogelsang, 2010; Srinuan et al., 2012) . In other areas fixed and mobile broadband may be complements, at least in the nascence of mobile broadband service .
Some economists argue that the mechanical application of traditional antitrust definitions such as SSNIP to technologically dynamic settings results in inappropriately small markets (Pleatsikas and Teece, 2001) . 21 In the geographical dimension of the market, we do not have household-level data to work with anyway. It also may be inappropriate to think of market definition in purely 18 "A Small but Significant and Non-transitory Increase in Price (SSNIP) test asks whether a hypothetical monopolist could profitably impose a small increase in price. If sufficient numbers of buyers would switch to alternative products or to suppliers at other locations such that the price increase is unprofitable, then the market definition must be expanded to include at least some of those substitute products or locations" (Connolly and Prieger, 2009) . 19 Of course, this statement is subject to falsification by reductio ad absurdum. Clearly if the price of broadband service were $1000 in Household A and $10 in neighboring Household B, there would be ways for the households to mutually benefit from "trade," (for example, through Household A piggybacking off the wireless home network of Household B). antitrust terms. On the supply side, a broadband provider clearly does not enter a market household by household, due to the economies of scale that make it economic to begin offering service with a footprint covering many households or businesses. At the small end of the geographical entry decision may be fiber, where entry into the broadband market may mean deploying the optical carrier infrastructure to serve a small group of office buildings in a dense urban center. At the other end of the geographic spectrum are the satellite firms, who upon entry can serve any location in the US with a clear view of the southern sky. The relevant geographic markets on the supply side for DSL, cable modem service, and wireless services fall between these extremes.
In the end, our choice of market definition is driven by what is available in the Form 477 data. We present results for four markets that are feasible to define with the data at hand. The largest market we examine, the US market, is the entire US (the 50 states plus Washington, DC) 22 and includes all forms of broadband without differentiation. The smallest market we investigate has the geographic extent of a ZCTA and is restricted to a single type of broadband in product space. We call this market ZIP-BB, since markets are distinguished by ZIP code and type of broadband. Widening the geographic extent of the market to the nation but still differentiating among broadband types gives us the US-BB market. While there is only one market per round with the US definition, there are eight markets per round with the US-BB definition, one each for ADSL, BPL, cable modem, fiber, satellite, fixed terrestrial wireless, mobile terrestrial wireless, and SDSL. The fourth definition, for the ZIP market, distinguishes between areas but not service types. The ZIP definition results in 31,706 markets per round (the number of ZCTA areas), while the ZIP-BB definition leads to 2,53,648 markets per round (eight service types for each ZCTA area). For the sake of brevity we focus mainly on the extreme cases, the US and ZIP-BB markets. 
Measures of Entry
Following Dunne et al. (1988) , we measure the amount and scale of entry as follows:
NT i (t) = total number of firms; the count of broadband providers present in market i (however defined) in period t. All firms under the same holding company count as a single firm.
NE i (t) = number of entrants; the count of broadband providers that enter market i in period t. In particular, the count of providers which are present in the Form 477 data in period t that were not present in the Form 477 data from period t-1.
quantity produced by a firm; the number of broadband lines that provider k (one of those present in market i) serves in period t. For markets US-BB and ZIP-BB, only lines of the same type of broadband service are counted. For the ZIP level markets, the line counts are those for the state level and thus are only a proxy of proportionality for ZIP level quantities. QT i (t) = total quantity produced; the sum of the number of lines served in period t by each of the broadband providers present in market i in period : ( ) ( ).
quantity produced of an entrant; the number of lines broadband provider k (one of the entrants in market i) serves in period t; constructed as for ( ).
total quantity produced by entrants; the sum of the number of lines served in period t by each of the broadband entrants present in market i in period : ( ) ( ).
Thus in the US market, an entrant is a firm appearing anywhere in the nation when it did not offer service anywhere the previous period. In the US-BB market, an entrant is a firm newly offering a particular type of service anywhere in the nation, even if it offered service of some other type previously. In the ZIP market, an entrant is a firm appearing in the ZIP code when it was not present in the ZIP code the previous period, regardless of broadband type. In the ZIP-BB market, an entrant is a firm newly offering a particular type of service in the ZIP code, even if it offered service of some other type previously in the same area.
The entry rate ER in market i in period t is:
Following the convention of Dunne et al. (1988) and other authors, the denominator is the number of firms present in the previous period. In the absence of exit, ER i (t) is thus the percentage increase in the number of firms between periods t and t-1.
To examine how the size of entrants compares with that of existing providers in the market, we define ESH, the entrants' share of the broadband lines served by all the firms active in market i as
The interpretation for the national level markets is straightforward. However, care must be taken in interpreting ESH i (t) for the geographically delineated markets, for in such cases ESH is not the market share of output in market i that is produced by entrants. Market share within the ZIP code is unknown since providers were not required to report subscribers or lines by ZIP code. Instead, for the ZIP markets ESH i (t) is the number of lines across the state served by the entrants in market i, expressed as the ratio to the sum of the number of lines in the state served by all firms in market i. 24 Thus for the ZIP markets ESH measures the proportion of the state-level scale of firms in market i (which may not offer service everywhere in the state) due to entrants.
We define the average size of entering firms (measured as the state-level scale of their operations, in the case of the ZIP markets) relative to that of incumbents, ERS, as
QE t NE t ERS t QT t QE t NT t NE t = − −
ERS allows us to compare the relative scale of entrants to incumbents at a point in time. In the denominator, the measures appropriate to the incumbents are calculated by removing the entrants' measures from the totals. ERS is undefined when there is no entry.
Measures of Exit
Similarly, we measure exit using the following:
NX i (t) = number of exiting firms ("exiters"); count of the broadband providers that exit market i between periods t-1 and t. In particular, NX i (t) is the count of providers present in the Form 477 data in period t-1 that were no longer present in the Form 477 data from period t.
quantity produced by an exiter; the number of lines broadband served in period t-1 by broadband provider k (one of the providers exiting market i between periods t-1 and t); constructed as for ( ).
the total quantity produced by exiters; the sum of the number of lines served in period t-1 by each of the broadband firms exiting market i between periods t-1 and : ( ) ( ).
Note the convention for the timing: an exiting firm in period t left the market between periods t-1 and t, and the quantities associated with the exiters pertain to the last period in which they provided service. As with entry, exit is market specific: a firm exits the US market if it does not appear anywhere in the data for period t when it was present in t-1; a firm exits the US-BB market for a broadband type if it does not offer that type of service anywhere in period t when it did in t-1; a firm exits a ZIP market if it does not offer service of any type in the ZIP code when it did the previous period; and a firm exits a ZIP-BB market for a broadband type if it does not offer that type of service in the ZIP code when it did the previous period.
Using these definitions, the exit rate XR in market i in period t is:
In the absence of entry, XR i (t) is thus the percentage decrease in the number of firms between periods t and t-1. Note that the exit rate is undefined for empty markets (those for which NT i (t-1) = 0).
To examine how the size of exiting firms compares with that of existing providers in the market, we define the exiters' share (XSH) of the ZIP codes served by all the firms active in market i as
Similar to ESH, for the ZIP level markets XSH i (t) is the number of lines in the state served by the firms that exited market i just prior to period t, expressed as the ratio to the state-aggregated line count for all firms in market i are present (also in period t-1).
25 Thus, for the ZIP markets XSH measures the proportion of the state-level scale of firms in market i due to exiters.
Finally, the average size of exiting firms (measured as the state-level scale of their operations, in the case of the ZIP markets) relative to that of incumbents, XRS, is:
XRS allows us to compare the scale of exiting firms relative to incumbents at a point in time. In the denominator, the measures appropriate to the incumbents are calculated by removing the exiting firms' measures from the totals. XRS is undefined when there is no exit.
Sources of Entry and Exit
We also investigate from where entry arises in the US-BB, ZIP, and ZIP-BB markets. A de novo entrant in period t is a firm appearing somewhere in the Form 477 data in period t but nowhere in the data in period t-1. Such entry is also called "greenfield" entry in the literature. We assume that the new firm uses new infrastructure to provide service, which will be the case to the extent that we have properly accounted for asset sales.
Entry in the ZIP and ZIP-BB markets can also occur through geographic expansion: the first appearance of the firm in the ZIP code. In this case, the geographically expanding firm previously offered service in other ZIP codes. Although new ZIP codes may be served by existing telecommunications infrastructure in some cases, typically geographic expansion requires new plant. Finally, a firm can enter the US-BB and ZIP-BB markets through diversifying its service mix. For example, a firm offering ADSL in period 15 in the ZIP area who expands its service offerings to include SDSL in period 16 is counted as a diversifying entrant in the period 16 SDSL market in the same ZIP area.
The nomenclature for exit is similar. Complete exit means the disappearance of the firm from all markets. Geographic contraction is the disappearance of the firm from the ZIP code, while continuing to serve customers elsewhere. Consolidating firms stop offering one type of broadband while continuing to offer other modes in the geographic market. In other words, exit of this type means the firm is reducing its product mix.
Adjustment to Exclude Single-Round Entry and Exit
With the measures of entry and exit proposed above, there is a great amount of one-round entry and exit in the ZIP-level markets. That is, there appears to be an inordinate number of firms that enter a market in one round but are missing again the next ("one-round entry"). Similarly, there are many instances of firms that exit a ZIP code in one round, only to return in the next round ("one-round exit"). In the ZIP-BB market, 20.4% of all entry is one-round entry. Over half (52%) of these one-round entrants may have exited legitimately due to some sort of merger event, leaving about one-tenth of all entry as unexplained one-round entry. There is similarly a nontrivial amount of one-round exit. Taken at face value, these figures indicate a remarkably dynamic and contestable market, with firms hopping in and out of the various local markets to take advantage of transient profit opportunities (Baumol et al., 1982) .
Upon closer examination, however, it seems likely that the amount of entry and exit is exaggerated in these data. Given the importance of sunk costs in the telecommunications industry, it is unlikely that such a large amount of "hit and run" entry occurs. Alternative reasons for apparent one-round entry or exit include: mistyped ZIP codes when the firm filled out Form 477, 26 failure to file a Form 477 in a particular period, 27 and failure on our part to match provider names correctly over time.
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To avoid overstating the amount of entry and exit, we therefore also calculate statistics excluding the one-round entrants and exiters. In the tables and discussion to follow, when one-round entry and exit remains in the data we call the statistic at issue "unadjusted." When one-round entry and exit has been removed before calculating the statistic, we call the result "adjusted." To the extent that an unknown amount of one-round entry and exit is spurious, the adjusted and unadjusted figures will bracket the true level. To err on the side of conservatism, when we present only one figure for the sake of brevity, it is from the adjusted data.
Note that use of the adjusted data also reduces the impact on entry and exit rates of another potential problem.
29 A firm's market presence in a ZIP code area may appear to "flicker" in and out when in fact the firm's demand is changing between zero and non-zero in a thin market. This may happen if the firm's coverage area overlaps with only a sparsely populated portion of a ZIP code. We cannot assess how often this occurs, but expect it to be relatively rare since it requires a particular combination of circumstances, and therefore to affect the average entry and exit rates little. The US-level markets are immune to this problem.
Basic Analysis of Entry and Exit
We now turn to the analysis of entry and exit in the market for broadband service provision. Throughout this section we will compare our results with those of Dunne et al. (1988) and other studies of entry and exit (Koski and Sierimo, 2003; Bartelsman et al., 2005; Lotti, 2007) .
26 We found instances of obviously mistyped ZIP codes in the Forms (e.g., those where the ZIP code does not match the state to which the firm's Form 477 purportedly pertains). 27 This happens mainly with smaller firms; we cannot be sure a non-filing firm did not have a legitimate reason for not filing. 28 Given our extensive checking of the provider names, we expect errors of this type to be rare. 29 A referee raised this issue.
We begin by examining the average levels of entry and exit in the broadband market, breaking each down into specific modes of entry and exit. In subsection 3.1, we consider how entry and exit rates are distributed within markets, to give a sense of how the industry dynamics vary both within and across markets. In subsection 3.2, we look at how the entry and exit rates are correlated with themselves and with each other, which sheds additional light on the dynamics of the broadband market.
Entry and Exit Rates
Availability of broadband service was widespread in the US during the period under study. On average during 2005-2008, only 2.8% of ZIP code areas in our data lacked at least one broadband provider using the adjusted data, and this figure declined steadily during that time. The figures are nearly the same in the unadjusted data. The statistics showing near ubiquity of broadband service availability mask a great amount of dynamism in the marketplace, as demonstrated in this section.
Average Entry and Exit Statistics
We begin our description of entry and exit in the broadband market by measuring the average levels. Unlike Dunne et al. (1988) , who drop the smallest firms from their analysis, we include all firms in our calculations.
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For the national broadband market including all types of broadband (the US market), the entry and exit rates measure the turnover in firms that show up at least once in the Form 477 data. The figures are given in Table 2 . The first fact that is apparent is the great amount of entry and exit that occurs. The semi-annual unadjusted entry rate varies from 5.6% (June 2008) to 15.2% (December 2005) , and has an annualized average rate of 19.2%. Even the adjusted rates are high, 30 Dunne et al. (1988) drop small manufacturing firms since the geographic extent of their market definition is the entire US and small firms are not very important in that context. The nature of broadband service provision, however, means that even small firms may be very important to subscribers within the area they serve. Subscribers cannot go to larger firms offering service in other areas, and the relevant options for the household or business include all market participants, no matter how small. Furthermore, excluding smaller firms would exclude virtually all rural telecommunication carriers, which are important providers of broadband in many rural areas. The entry and exit rates are annualized (only) in the final column. The US market has the geographic extent of the entire US and groups all broadband types together. See Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 for definitions of statistics, and Section 2.2.5 for the distinction between the adjusted and unadjusted figures.
varying from 4.6% to 11.6%, yielding a 13.6% annualized average entry rate. Entry is thus higher than many yearly entry rates found in the literature, for example a 9.8% entry rate for manufacturing firms from Dunne et al. (1988) 31 or 7-10% for the Italian services industry (Lotti, 2007) . The broadband figures are closer to entry rates found for ICT firms, for example a 14.5% entry rate for Finnish ICT firms (Koski and Sierimo, 2003 ; one of the very few studies looking specifically at the ICT sector). Koski and Sierimo (2003) also find that ICT industries have higher entry rates than other industries, although not to the degree found here and they did not focus on Internet service providers. The high-end adjusted broadband entry rate (from December 2005, annualized to 23%) is more than twice the rate from Dunne et al. (1988) . Thus, as is to be expected in a rapidly growing industry, 32 entry is relatively high. There is an overall slowing in the entry rate over the years, but the period-to-period variation is high and the reduction in the entry rate is not smoothly decreasing. While the variation in the entry rate may point to some underlying incompleteness in the data, 33 it may also merely reflect the volatile nature of the market.
Entrants are small in the national market, compared both to the entire market and to incumbents. The entrants' share of the market (ESH, also shown in Table 2 ; refer to Section 2.2.2 for its definition) is only 0.1-0.3% across most of the periods. This is much smaller than the figures for manufacturing in Dunne et al. (1988) , but at least some of the difference is accounted for by their 5-year periods, which gives entrants more time to grow their market share. Entrants are also seen to be small by considering their relative size (ERS), which is always well below one (ERS equal to one would imply that the entrants are just as large as incumbents). In fact, ERS is typically in the range 1.2-3.0%, which implies that incumbents as a group are 33-83 times larger than entrants are in a typical round. Dunne et al. (1988) also find that entrants are smaller in terms of market share and relative size to incumbents, although not to this degree.
The exit rate (XR) also generally trends downward, from the highest unadjusted rate of 11% (June 2006) to the lowest rate of 5.4% at the end of the sample. The average unadjusted exit rate is 16.5% per annum. This is about twice as high 31 The simple average of the manufacturing entry rates reported over 1963 -1982 in Dunne et al. (1988 (for firms of all sizes) is 9.8%. 32 See Siegfried and Evans (1994: p. 127 ). 33 One unanswered question is why is the entry rate is always higher in the December filings. One possibility is that some firms did not actually update their mid-year data as they were supposed to, but instead submitted the same ZIP code list as for the previous December filing. If that were so, however, then the exit rates should always be substantially higher in the June periods, which is not the case.
as the yearly exit rate for manufacturing firms from Dunne et al. (1988) , about three times as high as for the services industry (Lotti, 2007) , and 1.8 times as high as for ICT firms (Koski and Sierimo, 2003) . Even the adjusted annualized average exit rate of 11% is higher than in these other industries. The turnover rates (the sum of the entry and exit rates) of about 35% (unadjusted) and 25% (adjusted) are both higher than the turnover rates found by Bartelsman et al. (2005) in 10 OECD countries for the manufacturing, business, and business services sectors.
Comparison with the entry rate reveals two interesting facts. First, the exit rate is lower on average than the entry rate, which reflects that the number of firms in the market is growing during [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . More interesting, however, is how much of the dynamism of the market one would miss if only net entry were examined. Net entry in the US market is about 3.1% per year during this period. 34 The gross entry and exit rates, which are in the range 11-30% per year (unadjusted) or 8-23% per year (adjusted), contrast markedly with the slower net growth rate. Any entry analysis conducted on the publicly available FCC data, which provides only the count of firms operating each period, would miss much of the action.
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As with the entrants, exiting broadband providers are also smaller than other firms in general. However, they are usually larger than entrants, which is in accord with the findings of Dunne et al. (1988) . The share of the exiting firms (XSH) is less than one-ninth in all periods, and averages 1.6%. Exiting providers are also small relative to surviving firms (XRS), which is always less than one except for December 2006, which has an outlier of 157%. The December 2006 figure is abnormally high because of the Verizon acquisition of MCI; the latter was much larger than the typical exiting firm. Except for December 2006, the relative size of exiting firms is in the range of 3-8%, which implies that surviving firms as a group are 13-36 times as large as exiting firms in typical periods.
Changing our focus to the US-BB market, in which each broadband type is treated as a distinct market, we see from Table 3 that the entry and exit rates are even higher than they are in the US market. The entry and exit rates are annualized (only) in the final column. The US-BB market has the geographic extent of the entire US and differentiates among broadband types. The ZIP market has the geographic extent of a ZCTA and groups all broadband types together. See Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3
for definitions of statistics, and Section 2.2.5 for the distinction between the adjusted and unadjusted figures.
market. The unadjusted entry rate, averaged across broadband types and time, is an annualized 32.4%, with 23.6% for the adjusted rate, and both decline over time as the market matures. The entry rates are more than two to three times the entry rate of manufacturing firms found by Dunne et al. (1988) . 37 The exit rates of 23.2% (unadjusted) and 14.5% (adjusted) are also higher than the exit rates for the US market or for manufacturing firms from Dunne et al. (1988) .
Many residential broadband customers at the time viewed DSL and cable modem service as their main options. In the middle rows of Table 3 , the statistics for the US-BB market are recalculated including only ADSL and cable modem markets. These markets were more mature than the markets for fiber and mobile wireless (refer back to Table 1 ), which we will show below had high entry rates. Therefore, the entry and exit rates for ADSL and cable modem markets are lower than for the US-BB market as a whole. The entry and exit rates for ADSL and cable modem are about 40-45% lower than those for the entire market. To assess the importance of ADSL and cable modem service in another way, note that about one-third of all entering and exiting firms in the US-BB market offer these service types.
In the ZIP market, the narrower market definition (which is closer to the set of services available at a single household or business location) leads to a more dynamic picture of entry and exit. At annualized average rates of 37% (adjusted) to 49% (unadjusted), there is far more entry than in the US, US-BB, or manufacturing markets. Similar patterns are discerned as found above: declining entry and exit rates as time passes, and more entry than exit. The ZIP entry rates tend to be higher than the national-scope figures because the denominators are so much smaller -there were typically only a few providers in each ZIP code at the time. The exit rates are lower than in the US-BB market. Coupled with the higher entry rates, this implies that the net geographic expansion of broadband during the period proceeded at a faster pace than the growth of the national (US and US-BB) markets.
Comparison of the ZIP market entry rates with other studies is difficult, because most studies use national-level markets and aggregate entry across local establishments to the firm level. However, with some recalculations we can compare our data with entry rates of establishments in the US for the same years calculated from the US Census Bureau's Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS). Counts of establishments reflect the local presence of firms, which may have 37 Dunne et al. (1988) delineate product markets at the four-digit SIC level, which is an intermediate level of aggregation between the US and US-BB markets. Mobile and wireline communications services have different four-digit SIC codes, but all types of wired communications have the same code. numerous establishments. In this sense, each appearance of a service provider in a ZIP code is roughly analogous to an establishment. Treating appearance in the ZIP code as an establishment, the broadband establishment entry rate in the US averages 18.3% (unadjusted) to 13.6% (adjusted). This range is higher than the BDS entry rates for establishments in the manufacturing (7.5%), services (12.2%), and transportation, communications, and utilities (13.2%) sectors. The only sector in the BDS data approaching the level of entry we find for broadband is finance, insurance, and real estate, with a 13.2% entry rate.
We now turn to the smallest market definition, the ZIP-BB market, which draws the narrowest boundaries around the market in both geographic and product space. Each broadband type within a ZIP code area is treated as a distinct market. With such a narrow definition, there are many markets with no providers, and in such markets ER is undefined. Following Dunne et al. (1988) , any of our statistics that are undefined are not included in the summary statistics.
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For the ZIP-BB market, we see from Table 4 that the entry and exit rates are much higher than in the US market but about the same as in the US-BB market. The 6-month entry rate is highest in June 2006 (21.4% unadjusted, 19.7% adjusted) and lowest in December 2007 (13.2% unadjusted, 7% adjusted), and averages annualized rates of 34.2% unadjusted and 25.7% adjusted. The entry and exit rates in the ZIP-BB market are lower than those in the ZIP market, although the large fraction of markets for which ER is undefined makes direct comparison problematic.
The market share of entrants in the ZIP-BB market is about the same as the semi-annual entry rates, implying that the scale of entry in the market is similar whether measured by counting firms or their market share. ESH ranges from 5.2% to 17.1%, and averages 12.0%. However, the average relative size of entrants is much larger than that of incumbents: ERS averages 29, which is much higher than Dunne et al. (1988) found for manufacturing firms. The distribution of relative sizes of entrants is highly skewed, however, due to the entry of large firms like Verizon and AT&T into new ZIP codes. The median ERS, which is affected little by the few huge entrants, ranges from 0.09 to 1.4. 38 ER is undefined for half of the ZIP-BB markets; in the great majority of such cases there is no entry. ER is undefined most often for the least-common broadband types. ER is undefined for BPL in virtually all markets, and is undefined for TFW in 79% of ZIP code-rounds. Other modes of service with a large number of ZIP codes-rounds with undefined ER are fiber (63%) and SDSL (61%). At the other end of the spectrum, ER is undefined for satellite service in only 13% of markets. In the working paper (Connolly and Prieger, 2013) , we calculated an alternative entry rate with NT i (t) in the denominator, which unlike ER is defined for the first entrant, but the summary statistics for entry did not differ greatly. The trend in the exit rate (XR) is generally downward. The highest exit rate of 16.8% (unadjusted, or 14.3% adjusted) is at the beginning and the lowest rate of 5.0% (unadjusted, or 3.9% adjusted) is at the end of the sample. The average annualized exit rate is 12% if adjusted, 23% if not. Exiting broadband providers are larger than non-exiting firms on average, as shown by the figures for XRS in Table 4 , although as with the entrant relative size the median XRS is usually below one. Thus the typical exiting firm is relatively small, as may be expected. Excluding December 2007, surviving firms in the median markets are anywhere from 2 to 19 times the size of exiting firms.
Disaggregating the Sources of Entry
Entry is broken down by source in the top half of Table 5 for the US-BB, ZIP, and ZIP-BB markets (refer to Section 2.2.4 for the definitions of entry types). In the US-BB market, more entry comes from new firms than from providers offering a new service type. About 59% of the total entry rate comes from de novo entry, which is about the same as Dunne et al. (1988) found for manufacturing firms. The de novo entrants have about the same market share and relative size as do the diversifying firms.
Most entry in the ZIP and ZIP-BB markets is from geographic expansion. In the ZIP market, 92% of entry is through geographic expansion, and the rest is de novo. For the ZIP-BB market, 74% of entry is through geographic expansion, 20% is through service diversification, and the remaining entry is de novo. So, from the consumer's point of view, most entry in these markets takes the form of an existing provider beginning to offer service in the area. The same is true when measuring entrants by their market share.
In the ZIP and ZIP-BB markets, the relative size of entrant to incumbent (ERS) is much larger for geographically expanding than for completely new firms. In the ZIP-BB market, diversifying firms have the largest relative size of all. For that market, on average, geographically expanding firms are 26 times as large as incumbents, product diversifiers are 42 times as large, and completely new entrants are three times as large. The average entry rates are highly skewed by firms with large service footprints and many existing customers expanding into an area previously served only by smaller providers. The median figures for entrants' relative size ERS in Table 5 are all below one except for diversifying entrants in the ZIP-BB market, which are about the same size as existing firms. The median ERS for de novo entry averages 0.02 in the ZIP-BB market, indicating that a typical de novo entrant faces incumbents that are about 40 times larger than the entrant. 
Disaggregating the Sources of Exit
By categorizing the modes of exit, we are able to examine where firms go or remain when they exit a market. The disaggregation of the exit rates is in the bottom half of Table 5 . In the US-BB market, a firm can exit by completely disappearing or by reducing its product mix. The exit rates show that two-thirds of exit coincides with the withdrawal of the firm from all modes of provision. Coupled with the results for the entry rates, we find that diversification into and consolidation out of other service types together account for the minor part of the dynamics in the US-BB market. In addition to complete exit, in the ZIP market a firm can also exit by contraction in the geographic dimension. The lion's share of exit is of the latter type. The figures for the exit rates for the ZIP market in Table 5 show that just as most entry stems from geographic expansion, most exit reflects geographic contraction. The importance of geographic consolidation in exit is even larger in terms of market share. The relative size of consolidating firms is also greater than the relative size of completely disappearing firms, whether looking at mean or median relative size of exiting firms (XRS). This finding seems to imply that larger firms are engaged in more dynamic geographic behavior overall than are smaller firms. The small incumbent ILEC offering service in a few rural ZIP codes may never exit, but neither may it expand to other areas. In summary, most entry and exit in the ZIP market comes from geographic movement, and much expansion and consolidation comes from larger firms.
In the ZIP-BB market a firm can exit by all three routes. As in the ZIP market, most exit in the ZIP-BB market reflects geographic contraction. On average, 55% of exiting firms are contracting geographically, 26% are consolidating their service types, and the remaining 19% completely exit all markets. Measuring exit by market shares instead does not change the relative importance of the three modes of exit.
The relative size of consolidating firms, whether by geography or product mix, average or median, is generally greater than the relative size of completely disappearing firms. This appears to indicate that firms shrink (or never grew) before they die. From the statistics for XRS in Table 5 , the disappearing firms are on average 2.5 times larger than remaining firms, whereas by the median completely exiting firms are only 16% as large as are firms continuing in the market. Geographic contractors are 28 times larger on average than firms remaining in the market, but only 15% as large when looking at the median (the one statistic that is about the same as for complete exit). Product mix reducers are 15 times larger than remaining firms on average, but only 60% as large by median. The comparisons of mean to median again reflect that a few large firms are engaged in more dynamic behavior overall than are smaller firms.
Variation in Entry and Exit across Broadband Types
The average statistics in the previous section mask a great amount of variation in the entry and exit rates among different types of broadband service. In this section, we distinguish between modes of provision to examine how the measures of entry and exit vary across time and (for the ZIP-BB market) geography. By doing so, we can compare both the mean and variance of entry and exit across types of broadband.
The infrastructure required to serve broadband varies greatly across the modes of provision. DSL runs over the legacy copper last-mile of the telecommunications network (which may require conditioning for DSL to work), and requires installation of additional equipment in the telephone company's local central offices or remote terminals. Verizon FIOS, AT&T U-Verse, and similar broadband services entail laying new fiber to the neighborhood or home of the subscriber in most areas, as well as installation of additional equipment in the central office. Cable modem service utilizes the cable companies' hybrid fibercoaxial network plant along with networking equipment in the local headends; offering more broadband capacity often requires pushing fiber further out in the network toward the end-users. Satellite broadband service requires the launch and maintenance of communications satellites into orbit, which is both risky and hugely expensive. Mobile wireless broadband networks make use of spectrum licensed by the FCC, and the same antennas and wired backhaul network used for voice communication. Fixed wireless service can be offered over unlicensed spectrum as well as licensed. Broadband over power line runs over the existing electricity copper network. 39 We are not aware of any systematic econometric comparison of the cost functions for all these types of service, but roughly speaking the fixed costs are highest for satellite, next highest for wired options, and probably lowest in most areas for wireless. 40 If for no other reason than the greatly varying cost structures involved, we expect there to be large differences in both the rates and scale of entry. Table 6 presents the averages, medians, and measures of dispersion in the entry rates for the US-BB and ZIP-BB markets. In the US-BB market, variation occurs only across periods. Looking at the statistics for the mean entry rates in 39 However, additional cost created by differences in the physical characteristics of electricity networks, as well as the fact that electricity lines are electromagnetically "noisy" environments for communications compared with the phone companies' networks mean that the cost advantages of using existing plant is attenuated. 40 For the argument that wireless broadband has lower sunk cost than wired broadband, see US DOJ (2010), Section 2.5. Means and deciles are calculated for each broadband type, across the six semi-annual rounds, and are not annualized. For ZIP-BB market, statistics are also across all the ZIP codes in the data. ERS is undefined for BPL firms because there is only ever a single firm providing BPL service at a time, and so there are never any incumbents upon entry.
the first column of Table 6 , it is clear that some types of broadband experienced much more entry than others. At one extreme, there was no entry at all in the satellite broadband market at the national level, a symptom of the entry barriers from the risk and huge sunk costs of deploying satellites. 41 The highest entry rate is for mobile wireless, with a mean entry rate of 38%. From the greatest to the least average entry rate in the US-BB market, the order is mobile wireless, fiber, BPL, fixed wireless, cable modem, SDSL, ADSL, and satellite. The most mature markets, those for DSL and cable modem, show up with relatively lower growth rates, as may be expected. 42 In addition to being a relatively new market, mobile 41 Four satellite providers remain in the data throughout all rounds, one of which offers service only in Alaska. 42 In many theoretical models of industry dynamics, the entry rate falls as the industry matures. See Prieger (2007) and Klepper (1996) .
wireless may also have a high entry rate due to the lower entry barriers from sunk costs. 43 For some broadband types, there is a lot of variation in the entry rate across time in the US-BB market, as seen from the range of ER (also in the first column of Table 6 ). For example, mobile broadband entry rates range from 5% to 75%. The range of entry rates is much narrower for some other types such as ADSL and fiber (and, in the extreme with no entry at all, satellite).
In the ZIP-BB market, variation occurs not only across the six rounds of data but also across ZIP code areas. It is apparent that the local markets are highly dynamic, and that there is a great variety of outcomes within each broadband type. The result follows in part from the small geographic scale of the ZIP-BB market and the small number of providers in a ZIP code. 44   Table 6 also shows that, similar to the US-BB market, entry is much more prominent in some broadband types than others at the ZIP code level. The entry rate is highest for mobile wireless (as in the national market), at 27%, and lowest for cable modem. The ranking of the entry rates is similar but not identical to that in the national market (the Spearman correlation between the rankings is positive). From the greatest to the least average entry rate, the order is: mobile wireless, fiber, satellite, ADSL, SDSL, fixed wireless, cable modem, and BPL.
45 Entry in the satellite market looks quite different in the ZIP-BB market, compared to the national level. While there are no new satellite broadband providers at the national level during this period, there are many local markets where the satellite firms enter by picking up customers where they formerly had none.
46 So, while the entry rate for satellite is zero in the national market, it is ranked fifth in the ZIP-BB market. The change in the level of geographic aggregation also affects some of the other comparisons between broadband types. Whereas in the US-BB market ADSL had a lower entry rate than cable modem, in the ZIP-BB market the ADSL entry rate is five times that of cable modem service.
In Section A above, it was noted that much market entry comes from larger firms. A study of the figures for the relative size of entrants (ERS) delineated 43 For a review of the confirmatory empirical evidence on the importance of sunk cost as an entry barrier, see Siegfried and Evans (1994) , Section II.B.1.a, and references cited therein. 44 A firm beginning to offer ADSL may be the first, second, or third entrant in a given ZIP code in which it offers service, which explains both the higher entry rates in the ZIP-BB market as well as the great variance in the entry rate. 45 Since there is only one BPL provider at most in a market, the entry rate for BPL is always either zero or undefined, which is why it is ranked last in terms of ER. 46 It is important to note that "entry" for the satellite firms mainly reflects changes in demand, not supply, since the firms do not deploy new infrastructure to "enter" a ZIP code. However, the firms may have engaged in targeted marketing efforts to expand demand in certain areas.
by service type (see the rightmost column in Table 6 ) shows that this is especially true for DSL, fiber, cable modem, and most of all mobile wireless providers. Entrants offering DSL, fiber, or cable modem service are 18-42 times as large on average as market incumbents. As with the aggregated market statistic examined above, the average ERS is skewed because of the largest providers; the median DSL, fiber, or cable modem service entrant is smaller than the incumbent. However, for mobile wireless service, both the average and the median entrant is larger than the incumbent. During this period, the major wireless providers were aggressively expanding their marketing and geographic availability of mobile broadband.
The distribution of the exit statistics in the US-BB market is in the first column of Table 7 . As there is with the entry rates, there is great variation among types. Nevertheless, except for satellite broadband, the average exit rate is smaller than the entry rate for the same type of service, implying that there was net entry into each type of broadband service. In order from the greatest to the least average exit rate, we have mobile wireless, SDSL, fixed wireless, satellite, fiber, cable modem, ADSL. There is no exit at all in the US-BB market for BPL. The ranges for the exit rates (shown in column one of Table 7) show less variation than there was in entry. The distribution of the exit statistics in the ZIP-BB market is in the last three columns of Table 7 . In order from the greatest to the least average exit rate, the order is SDSL with a 16.5% exit rate, fiber, fixed wireless, mobile wireless, ADSL, BPL, cable modem and satellite (with the latter two tied at 2.6%).
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Comparing the time-averaged entry and exit rates in the US-BB market, we see that types with high entry rates also tend to have high exit rates. The correlation between the time-averaged entry rates (shares) in Table 6 and the exit rates (shares) in Table 7 is 0.66 (0.20) for the US-BB market. Thus, similar patterns emerge for entry and exit across markets: when entry is high or has a large share for a broadband type, exit does too. Dunne et al. (1988) also found large positive correlation between entry and exit in manufacturing as well. Positive correlation between time-(and geography-) averaged entry and exit rates, shares, and relative sizes is also present in the ZIP-BB market: 0.11 for the rates, 0.40 for the shares, and 0.60 for the relative sizes. Positive correlation between entry and exit implies that there is less variation in the net entry rate across markets than there is in the gross entry and exit rates, yet another indication that examining net entry alone leaves would fail to uncover much of the market dynamics. We 47 The small exit rate for satellite service comes from fact that only two firms exited the national market during the period, and that the service footprints of the other providers did not change. Exit in the satellite ZIP-BB market nearly always comes from losing all customers in a ZIP code, not from making the service physically unavailable. examine the systematic relationships between entry and exit in more detail in the following section.
Correlation in Entry and Exit
To look at market-specific differences in entry and exit, we follow Dunne et al. (1988) and ask two questions. First, are the measures of entry and exit positively autocorrelated? If so, then the implication is that high entry (for example) in one period is likely to be followed by high entry in succeeding periods. Second, do high entry rates correspond with high exit rates? If so, then there would appear to be underlying factors causing the "churn rate" of firms in a market to be more stable within markets than across markets. We deal with these two questions in turn in this section.
Autocorrelation of Entry and of Exit
In Table 8 , we present the autocorrelations for the US-BB and ZIP-BB markets. 48 In the US-BB market, both the entry and exit rates show positive and large autocorrelation for all measures and at all lags, excepting only the fifth autocorrelation for the exit rate. Entrant shares (ESH), entrants' relative size (ERS), and exiter shares (XSH) also display positive autocorrelation. Dunne et al. (1988) interpreted their similar finding for the manufacturing industry as suggesting that there are persistent market-specific factors that affect both entry and exit. In other words, when entry is higher in, say, the mobile wireless market in a period than the average entry rate for all markets, then it is likely that the entry rate will continue to be higher in that mobile wireless market. Thus, there is evidence for factors unique 48 By conventional measures, the correlations are mostly statistically significant. However, since the data are a census of the entire population, from the viewpoint of finite population statistics the correlations are descriptive population quantities (Pfeffermann 1993) , not estimates, and thus have no variance. The significance levels reported in the tables are for the interpretation, more familiar to econometricians, of the data as a finite population drawn from an infinite superpopulation. A cell entry is the autocorrelation between the measure x given in the row heading and the same variable at various lags. The first column of figures is the first autocorrelation, the second column in the second autocorrelation, and so on up to the fifth autocorrelation.
to each mode of broadband provision that determine the dynamics of the market. This finding argues against grouping all forms of broadband internet access when analyzing broadband markets at the national level, as many studies do. In contrast, the autocorrelations in the various measures of entry and exit are quite small in the ZIP-BB market (see bottom half of Table 8 ). The same is true for the ZIP market (results not shown). When the geography of the market is local, apparently idiosyncratic time-varying factors are more important than location and type specific effects in determining market dynamics. This result may appear to be curious at first. Local market supply and demand factors have been shown to be important in other studies when estimating the number of firms (e.g., Prieger 2003; Flamm 2005) , and many of those factors are either fixed or slowly evolving in the short time frame studied here. However, the finding does not imply that there are no fixed effects determining the number of firms in the local markets. There can be fixed effects in a model for the stock NT i (t) without there being fixed effects in the flow components NE i (t) and NX i (t). 
Correlation Between Entry and Exit
The second question regarding market-specific differences in entry and exit is whether high entry and exit tend to occur together in a market. To address this, we calculate the correlation between each entry measure and its counterpart on the exit side, at various leads and lags. We already noted in section B above that the time-averaged entry and exit measures for the broadband types were positive correlated, which suggests that entry and exit are systematically and positive related within markets. Dunne et al. (1988) and several other empirical studies of market dynamics find that entry and exit rates are positively correlated across industries.
50 Geroski (1995) refers to this result as the third stylized fact about entry in the manufacturing sector, which has been found in other sectors as well (Lotti 2007) .
In this section, we refine that conclusion in two ways. First, we look at how entry is correlated with exit at other periods, as well as contemporaneously, to be able to answer (for example) how entry today correlates with exit six months or a year later. Second, we now consider the correlation between entry and exit in a 49 Since NT i (t) = NT i (t-1)+NE i (t)-NX i (t), it follows that even if there is a fixed effect in the model for NT i (t), there will not be one in ΔNT i (t) = NE i (t) -NX i (t). Thus it is possible there are no fixed effects in NE and NX even when there are in NT. 50 The theoretical model of Asplund and Nocke (2006) shows that entry and exit rates may rise together in response to an increase in fixed costs. single market over time, not just how entry relates to exit when both are first averaged across all time (and all ZIP codes, in the case of the ZIP-BB market).
The results for the US-BB and ZIP-BB markets are in Table 9 . The correlation between the contemporaneous entry and exit rates in the US-BB market is positive, at 0.47 (unadjusted) or 0.17 (adjusted; for both see the entries for the XR t row in the first column of Table 9 ), which means that broadband types with higher than average entry rates also tend to have higher than average exit rates. The correlation of the entry rate with previous and future exit rates is also positive (see the other figures in the first column of Table 9 ), demonstrating that there is persistence in the association between entry and exit. Thus, broadband types with high entry rates in general over time also have high exit rates, and broadband types with low entry rates have low exit rates. With one exception, the entry and exit rates are also positively correlated in the ZIP-BB market (third column of Table 9 ), although the correlations are smaller than for the US-BB market. All these results also hold when looking at shares instead of rates (see the second and fourth columns of Table 9 ). Each entry is the correlation between the exit variable in the row heading with the entry variable in the column subheading. All estimates are significant at the 1% level, treating data as a sample from an infinite superpopulation.
One possible cause for the positive correlation between entry and exit -that is, the existence of "churn" in the market -may be that there are systematic differences in the height of entry and exit barriers among the broadband types. Economic theory suggests many reasons why entry and exit barriers may be positively related within a market, and two may apply to the broadband service market in particular. 51 First, exit barriers are themselves entry barriers to forward looking firms. An exit barrier such as regulatory pressure to continue operating in a market even with losses makes it less likely that firms would want to enter. 52 Second, when incumbents have cost advantages over potential entrants, creating an entry barrier, the advantages often come from specific assets with little scrap value. When a large portion of capital costs are sunk (i.e., non-recoverable), as may be the case particularly with wired broadband, 53 then (conditional on entry having occurred) exit is discouraged because the opportunity cost of remaining in the market is lower.
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Conclusions
We collect the findings of our work here, and conclude by discussing some avenues for future work.
Finding 1:
There is a tremendous amount of (simultaneous) entry and exit in the US broadband market, however the market is defined. Siegfried and Evans (1994: p. 147) , and references cited therein. 52 The pressure to remain in an unprofitable market need not take the form of formal designation as a broadband carrier of last resort. Regulators in some states, and the FCC itself, have pushed telecommunications firms for many years to expand their broadband offerings, especially in areas labeled "disadvantaged." For example, the FCC approved the SBC acquisition of Ameritech in 1999 only subject to an agreement by the company to promote broadband Internet access (among other conditions). In particular, SBC was required to locate at least 10% of their advanced service facilities in low-income areas in the Ameritech region. State regulators in Ameritech's operating region (Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin) also pushed the merged firm to accelerate broadband deployment. Presumably neither the federal nor the state regulators would have been satisfied to see the firm begin to offer broadband in low-income areas only to have the service offerings cease after a short period. See Prieger and Hu (2008) . 53 See US DOJ (2010), Section II.E. 54 See Siegfried and Evans (1994: p. 145 ): "Tangible barriers to exit may include sunk costs in durable, industry-specific assets, which discourage exit because such assets do not have valuable alternative uses…." These authors conclude the balance of the empirical evidence supports this assertion.
See
The large amount of entry is particularly striking considering that the provision of broadband has several economic characteristics that are typically associated with barriers to entry. There are large fixed or sunk costs that create absolute cost disadvantages for entrants. The technology also leads to economies of scale, network economies, and economies of scope in the provision of multiple modes of broadband (e.g., ADSL and SDSL) that create relative cost disadvantages for entrants. 55 Apparently the dominant factor in the market, the growing demand for broadband service, trumped all other considerations during the period of study.
Furthermore, the fact that there is a high "churn rate" of firms in broadband markets has interesting implications for research analyzing entry decisions. The presence of simultaneous entry and exit implies that structural models for entry assuming homogeneous firms (Bresnahan and Reiss 1991) or models relying on the number of firms in the market as sufficient statistics [e.g., Xiao and Orazem (2011) for broadband markets and Greenstein and Mazzeo (2006) ] in the closely related industry of competitive local telephone services may not be the most appropriate for the US broadband market. Instead, models incorporating heterogeneity among firms' profit functions (Pakes et al. 2007 ), private information (Doraszelski and Satterthwaite 2010) , differing levels of strategic sophistication or rationality (Goldfarb and Xiao 2011) or learning (Hanazono and Yang 2009 ) may be more promising.
Finding 2: Most entry is from existing providers expanding into new geographic areas. Existing firms diversifying their service offerings is the next most common form of entry.
In the ZIP-BB market, 71% of entry (75% by share) is from geographic expansion of established service providers, and 21% is from product diversification within the area. Entrants into a market average 64% of the size of the incumbents combined, and thus are relatively large. Thus, notwithstanding potential antitrust concerns about the dominance of large broadband providers, as evinced by the DOJ and FCC in the recent review of the proposed merger of AT&T and T-Mobile USA, it appears that a large share of new options provided to consumers has come from these firms.
Finding 3: Entry and exit varies widely across the various modes of provision, and the highest entry rates also generally have the highest entrant shares.
The markets for some modes of provision are more dynamic (e.g., mobile wireless and fiber), whereas others are more stable (e.g., cable modem). This suggests future work explicitly modeling asymmetric competition among intermodal competitors, as in the work by Loomis and Swann (2005) .
Finding 4: Entry rates, entrant shares, and the relative sizes of entrants display positive autocorrelation in the US-BB market. The same is true for exit.
The implication is that there are persistent factors specific to the broadband mode that cause high entry (or exit) in one period to be followed by high entry (exit) in succeeding periods. This provides another reason to treat broadband types as heterogeneous in national-level studies of broadband markets.
Finding 5: There generally is positive correlation between the entry and exit rates at various leads and lags.
Broadband markets (local or national) with higher than average entry rates also tend to have higher than average exit rates, whether contemporaneously or at other leads and lags, demonstrating that there is persistence in the association between entry and exit. This persistence suggests that there are systematic differences among the broadband types in the height of entry and exit barriers. The sizes of entry and exit barriers also appear to be positively correlated. There appear to be underlying factors causing the "churn rate" of firms in a market to be more stable within than across markets.
We intend that these findings can both stimulate and guide future empirical and theoretical work in the broadband market. Although the FCC data examined here are confidential, the new National Broadband Map has publicly available data on which companies offer specific types of broadband service in fine geographic detail.
56 Thus, as new rounds of the semiannual National Broadband Map data become available, the dynamics of the US broadband market can be studied by all.
